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Constitutional Law-Due Process-Right to Counsel in
State Non-Capital Cases
Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having
broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Petitioner
was indigent, and requested the court to appoint counsel for him.
The court refused to appoint counsel, explaining that under Florida
law the court is permitted to so appoint only when a person is
charged with a capital offense. At the trial before a jury petitioner
presented his defense as well as could be expected from a layman.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced
to the state prison for a term of five years. Petitioner filed a habeas
corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court based on the failure
to appoint counsel and all relief was therein denied. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed and remanded. The Court's decision in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), that the failure to appoint counsel under particular facts
and circumstances did not amount to a denial of due process, was
overruled. It was held that appointment of counsel for an indigent
defendant is a fundamental right and essential to a fair trial.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
This unanimous decision to overrule Betts v. Brady appears
to have at last laid to rest the controversy which has sharply divided
the Court for the past twenty years as to the nature of an indigent
defendant's right to appointed counsel in state proceedings. The
fundamental problem revolves around the interpretation to be
given to the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. The fourteenth amendment requires that no state
shall ".

..

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.... ." U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The sixth
amendment states that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for

his defense." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. It was determined by the
Court many years ago that the first eight amendments are limitations on the authority of the federal government and have no
application to the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833). Thus, although some members of the Court have felt
that the fourteenth amendment made the sixth amendment applicable to the states, this view has never been accepted by a majority
of the Court. See Betts v. Brady, supra, (dissenting opinion). Several rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments, however,
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have been held to be absorbed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Grosiean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
On the other hand certain other rights were held not to be absorbed
by the due process clause. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884). The question of whether each individual right is made
obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment is answered
by determining whether each is ".. .of the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty", and whether to abolish them is to violate a
"principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental" Palko v. Connecticut,
supra at 325.
Because of the sharp schism which has existed on the Court
concerning the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, the
cases dealing with this right have followed a meandering course.
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932), the Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment absorbed those "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions." It was held that the right to counsel was of such a fundamental character as to be a necessary
requisite of due process of law. The Court, however, limited its
holding to the facts of the case, which involved a capital offense.
Five years later in Palko v. Connecticut, supra at 324, Justice
Cardozo recognized by dicta that the right to counsel was of such
a fundamental nature as to be protected from state abridgement
by the fourteenth amendment. Shortly after the Palko case, the
Court decided Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In this case
it was held that the right to counsel was an absolute and fundamental right in federal criminal prosecutions. If the accused were
indigent the Court said that counsel must be appointed to represent him, unless he had competently and intelligently waived his
right. Four years after the Zerbst case had firmly established the
federal right to counsel, the United States Supreme Court was
faced with the problem of whether or not counsel must be appointed for an indigent accused in state non-capital prosecutions.
In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), the Court held that
the asserted denial of due process because of failure to appoint

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol65/iss4/7

2

Haden: Constitutional Law--Due Process--Right to Counsel in Sate Non-Cap

1963 ]

CASE COMMENTS

counsel was to be tested by "... an appraisal of the totality of the
facts in a given case." It was held that what was a denial of fundamental fairness in one case might fall short of such a denial in
other circumstances. The Powell case was distinguished on the
grounds that it applied only when capital offenses were in issue.
Thus, the constitutionality of the failure to appoint counsel was
to be tested by whether, under the circumstances of a given case,
the accused was denied a fair trial. The adjudication of the right
to counsel was completed when the Court held in Chandler v.
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), that the right to be represented by
counsel which an accused himself employs was unqualified.
Thus, the stage was fully set for the decision in the principal
case. The Court had held that there was an absolute right to counsel
in federal criminal prosecutions. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. The right
of one to employ his own counsel was preserved inviolate. Chandler
v. Fretag,supra. In cases subsequent to the Powell case, supra, the
Court treated the right to counsel in state capital cases as being
absolute. Any lingering doubt as to the absolute nature of this right
was resolved in favor of the accused by Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961). Thus, it was only logical for the Court in the principal case to forge the final link in the chain of protection of an
accused's right to be represented by counsel. By extending this right
to state non-capital cases the Court was simply giving official recognition to what had in effect been the rule for many years. As
pointed out by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in the
principal case, no decision is found after Quicksall v. Michigan, 339
U.S. 660 (1950), in which the Court refused the right of counsel to
an indigent accused. See Gideon v. Wainwright,supra at 800.
In holding that the right to counsel is absolute, the Court
does not say that every criminal conviction is void simply because
the accused has not been represented by counsel. To the contrary,
it has been consistently held that the right to counsel may be waived
if such waiver be competently and intelligently made. The following elements are necessary to constitute a competent waiver: (1)
waiver must be voluntary, and understandingly made; (2) accused
must have known what he was doing when he made the decision;
and (3) accused must be competent in terms of maturity and intelligence. Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under State Law,
1955 Wis. L. REv. 281, 301. The Court has also held that a necessary prerequisite to an intelligent and understanding waiver is
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knowledge that the right exists. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962); Uveges v. Pennsylvania,335 U.S. 437 (1948).
The West Virginia Constitution provides that "In all such
trials [crimes and misdemeanors], the accused . . . shall have
the assistance of counsel . . ." W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 14.

In United States v. Adams, 165 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. W. Va. 1958), the
court held that the failure of the circuit court to inform the accused
of his right to demand counsel or to appoint counsel for him was
not a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment,
and was not a violation of a constitutional right to appointment of
counsel under the sixth amendment or the West Virginia Constitution. In so holding the court placed primary emphasis on three
West Virginia cases. In Ward v. Skeen, 140 W. Va. 565, 85 S.E.2d
845 (1955), the court said that the right to counsel is not an
absolute requirement, but only the right to demand counsel and
have counsel act pursuant to that demand. It was further held in
State v. Yoes, 67 W. Va. 546, 68 S.E. 181 (1910), that the right to
appointment of counsel is permissive and the record need not show
that the prisoner had such assistance in order to make the conviction
valid. The Adams case and the Ward case both cite State v. Briggs,
58 W. Va. 291, 52 S.E. 218 (1905), for the proposition that the right
can be waived by the silence of the accused and his mere failure to
request counsel. In the Briggs case, however, the accused actually
had the aid of two appointed counsel. The question involved in that
case was whether the accused was deprived of his constitutional
guaranty when one counsel withdrew without his consent. It is
submitted therefore that the language concerning the waiver of
counsel is dicta insofar as it is extended beyond the facts of the
Briggs case. In light of the holding of Gideon v. Wainwright, supra,
therefore, it appears that the West Virginia courts will henceforth be
required to affirmatively apprise the accused of his right to counsel
before a competent and intelligent waiver can be made. Anything
less than this will constitute a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Several important limitations of the decision in the principal
case should be noted as a matter of caution although it is beyond
the scope of this comment to discuss them in detail. First, the
opinion in the principal case takes no position on the question of
what degree of state cases may be included in the prohibition against
denial of counsel. Indeed, Mr. Justice Harlan, in a concurring
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opinion, states that ". . . whether the rule should extend to all
criminal cases need not now be decided." Gideon v. Wainwright,
supra at 801. A second problem is raised relevant to the stage of
the proceedings at which counsel is required to be appointed.
Should counsel be appointed to represent an indigent accused at
the time of arraignment? There is no definitive answer to this
question, but generally the determination depends upon whether
or not it is a critical stage of the proceedings. See Hamilton v.
Alabama, supra. But see 61 W. VA. L REv. 65 (1958).
By means of the decision in the principal case the United
States Supreme Court has removed one of the last remnants of
discrimination between state and federal defendants insofar as their
constitutional rights to the assistance of counsel are concerned.
The West Virginia courts appear to exercise a proper respect for the
rights of an indigent accused to have the assistance of counsel. It
is submitted, however, that those West Virginia courts which have
not affirmatively apprised the accused of his right to counsel in
the past should change this procedure in order to comply with
the dictates of due process. The United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that an accused cannot make an intelligent
waiver of counsel unless he is fully cognizant of his rights. It should
be noted in conclusion that West Virginia was one of the twenty-two
states which filed briefs, as friends of the Court, urging the overruling of Betts v. Brady, thus lending the official sanction of the
State to the holding in the principal case.
Robert EdwardHaden

Criminal Law-Common Law Forgery-Oral vs. Written
Representation of Authority
D stole a treasury check before it reached the hands of the
payee. Upon the promise to pay five dollars from the proceeds and
the oral representation that the check belonged to D's aunt and that
D had authority to cash it, D persuaded X, codefendant, to get the
check cashed. X took the check to a friend and told him either that
the check belonged to X's aunt or that it belonged to D's aunt and
that he had the payee's permission to indorse the check. X then indorsed the check with the name of the payee and the check was
cashed. D and X were found guilty of forgery. Held, affirmed. X,
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